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Abstract
Two recent studies have demonstrated that increases in arousal states lead to an increase people’s sense of agency, i.e., the 
subjective experience of controlling one’s own voluntary actions (Minohara et al. in Front Psychol 7:1165, 2016; Wen et al. 
in Conscious Cogn 36:87–95, 2015). We here extend these findings by showing that arousal states with negative emotional 
valence, such as fear and anger, decrease sense of agency. Anger and fear are negative emotional states. Anecdotally, they 
are often invoked as reasons for losing control, and neuroscientific evidence confirms important effects on the brain’s action 
control systems. Surprisingly, the subjective experience of acting in anger or fear has scarcely been investigated experimen-
tally. Thus, the legal notion that these intense emotions may undermine normal voluntary control over actions and outcomes 
(the ‘Loss of Control’, a partial defence for murder) lacks any clear evidence base. In three laboratory experiments, we 
measured sense of agency using an implicit measure based on time perception (the “intentional binding” paradigm). These 
actions occurred in either an emotionally neutral condition, or in a fearful (experiments 1 and 2) or angry state (experiment 
3). In line with our hypotheses, fear or anger reduced the subjective sense of control over an action outcome, even though 
the objective causal link between action and outcome remained the same. This gap between the objective facts of agency, 
and a reduced subjective experience of agency under emotional conditions, has important implications for society and law.
Keywords Sense of agency · Intentional binding · Fear · Anger · Loss of control
Introduction
‘Sense of agency’ refers to the subjective experience of con-
trolling one’s own voluntary actions, and, through them, of 
causing events in the external world. [for a thorough review 
of sense of agency research, please see (David et al. 2008; 
Haggard 2017)]. Two recent studies have demonstrated that 
unspecific arousal states (induced by colours or physical 
effort) increase people’s sense of agency over their actions 
(Minohara et al. 2016; Wen et al. 2015), while factors that 
decrease sense of agency will tend to reduce feelings of con-
trol and responsibility (Yoshie and Haggard 2013, 2017).
Being in control of, and thereby being responsible for 
one’s actions, is a key concept of criminal law. Although 
fear and anger are sometimes offered as reasons for reduced 
responsibility over one’s own actions, the effects of nega-
tively valenced arousal states on sense of agency remain 
unclear. Extreme stress and negative emotional states influ-
ence brain mechanisms underlying action control, focussing 
cognition on a single action, and limiting the consideration 
of alternative responses and their outcomes (Easterbrook 
1959). Thus, one might predict that induction of a nega-
tive emotional state such as fear or anger would reduce the 
sense of control over one’s actions. Indeed, several studies 
have shown that negative action outcomes, such as fearful 
or angry human vocalisations produced by voluntary key 
presses, reduce sense of agency over the committed action 
(Barlas et al. 2018; Christensen et al. 2016; Gentsch et al. 
2015; Takahata et al. 2012; Yoshie and Haggard 2013, 2017; 
but see; Moreton et al. 2017, for contrary findings). Other 
studies have demonstrated that positive emotion inductions 
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enhances sense of agency (Aarts et al. 2012), and alters 
awareness of the intention to act (Rigoni et al. 2015). How-
ever, none of those studies reproduces the scenario behind a 
Loss of Control legal defence, in which the key factor is the 
defendant’s emotional state prior to and during the action, 
rather than the emotional quality of the outcome. Rigoni 
et al. (2015) found increased awareness of intention to act 
when participants were in a positive emotional state, but 
found no effects of negative emotional states. These authors 
used a combined emotion induction procedure; participants 
listened to music of different emotional valence, while they 
read matching emotion-inducing sentences (positive, neutral, 
negative). The authors discuss whether their lack of findings 
for the negative emotion condition might be due to a weaker 
emotion induction effect for negative emotions.
“I just lost it!” is a common phrase in court rooms the 
world over. Furthermore, Loss of Control is a partial defence 
for murder in many jurisdictions. In English Law, for exam-
ple, a Defendant will not be convicted of murder if the “kill-
ing resulted from [the Defendant’s] Loss of Control” (Coro-
ners and Justice Act 2009, article 54, sect. 1a), as long as a 
range of conditions are met. These conditions include the 
emotional state of the defendant. This paper tests whether 
scientific evidence from psychological laboratory experi-
ments supports the link between emotion and action control 
implied by the Loss of Control defence. The law cannot rely 
only on a defendant’s subjective reports that they lost control 
because of possible abuse of this defence for secondary gain 
and evasion of punishment. Rather, the law must primar-
ily consider objective facts about whether the agent could 
have controlled their actions, while at the same time being 
aware of any possible biases in the agent’s reported subjec-
tive experience. Thus, the law must, directly or indirectly, 
confront one of the major questions of cognitive neurosci-
ence of agency: how do people experience their control over 
their voluntary actions? In normal circumstances, the objec-
tive physiological facts of motor action largely overlap with 
subjective experience. Agents are normally aware of what 
they are doing. However, research in cognitive neuroscience 
of voluntary motor control has shown that the usual link 
between the objective facts of control and the subjective 
feeling of control over a motor action can be altered under 
certain conditions. Thus, objective agency is expressed by 
the fact that “Agent A does Action B”. Subjective sense 
of agency is A’s feeling that they are doing/have done B 
(Desantis et al. 2011; Hommel 2015; Wegner et al. 2004). 
In healthy adult life, objective agency and subjective sense 
of agency are well aligned: we feel a strong sense of control 
over our own actions, and only over our own actions.
In cases of violent and aggressive actions, such as homi-
cides, the emotional states of fear and/or anger may feature 
strongly. Both these emotions prepare the body physiologi-
cally for action. However, the phrase “I just lost it” suggests 
that agents experience a reduction in subjective sense of 
agency over actions committed in fearful and angry states. 
Thus, strong emotions might open a gap in the normal align-
ment between the subjective experience and objective facts 
of agency on which the law relies. In principle, scientific 
data on both the objective controllability of action under 
emotion and the subjective experience of agency should be 
highly relevant to this question, but, in practice, current law 
has not been informed by the evidence base of cognitive 
or brain sciences. Previous studies reported reduced sense 
of agency over actions that produced negative, compared 
to either positive or neutral, outcomes (Barlas et al. 2018; 
Christensen et al. 2016; Gentsch et al. 2015; Yoshie and 
Haggard 2017). One might suggest, therefore, that negative 
emotions might cause a reduction in the sense of control over 
one’s own actions and their external outcomes. However, 
no study has yet investigated how the subjective sense of 
agency might be altered by inducing states of fear or anger.
Despite the negative valence of both fear and anger states, 
there are some reasons to predict that they might have dif-
ferent effects on sense of agency. Fear depends on subcor-
tical circuits which operate preconsciously—notably the 
amygdala (LeDoux 2003)—while the anger state recruits 
a broader cortical network (Denson et al. 2009). Moreover, 
fear and anger are associated with different action tenden-
cies; fear facilitates automatic withdrawal responses or 
action inhibition (e.g., fleeing or freezing), at least as an 
initial effect of fear. In contrast, anger facilitates approach 
behaviours (e.g., aggression, fighting; Carver and Harmon-
Jones 2009; Davidson 1992; Frijda 1987). Here, we have 
focussed on how these emotional states influence the expe-
rience of a voluntary instrumental action, rather than the 
actual flight/fight behaviours with which they are associ-
ated. On this basis, we hypothesised that fear states would 
abolish sense of agency over outcomes of voluntary action, 
for two reasons. First, fear is associated with preconscious, 
automated behavioural patterns (LeDoux 2003) and might 
thus have decreasing effects on sense of agency, making vol-
untary actions feel involuntary. Second, flight responses trig-
gered by fear involve abandoning instrumental agency over 
the current environment, again abandoning voluntary con-
trol, in favour of moving to a different, safer environment.
Regarding the anger state, one prediction would be that 
anger states enhance sense of agency. Certainly, motivation 
of goal-directed actions can be boosted by anger [though 
Aarts et al. (2010) only found this effect when the outcome 
was rewarding), and anger is subjectively experienced as a 
hyperkinetic phenomenon (“I knew I shouldn’t have hit him, 
but I was so angry…”]. On the other hand, it remains unclear 
whether the basic, impulsive motor actions that are associ-
ated with the anger state indeed produce a genuine sense of 
agency in the same way as reason-responsive, goal-directed 
actions (“… that I suddenly found myself punching him in 
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the face”). In that case, anger states might conceivably be 
associated with reduced sense of agency.
Three experiments tested these predictions. Established 
laboratory models of fear (experiments 1 and 2) and anger 
(experiment 3) were induced in healthy volunteers, who 
made voluntary keypress ‘actions’ that caused a tone (i.e., 
the ‘outcome of the action’) 250 ms later. We used this 
well-known ‘intentional binding’ paradigm (Haggard et al. 
2002), to obtain an implicit measure of sense of agency. This 
allowed us to investigate how fear and anger states influence 
sense of agency over actions.
We specifically focussed on action binding, defined as the 
shift in the perceived time of an action (keypress) towards 
the outcome (tone) it produces. Previous research suggests 
that action binding is specific to conditions, where an action 
is internally generated and executed voluntarily (Borhani 
et al. 2017). Therefore, action binding provides a direct 
measure of the degree to which the mental representation 
of an action is linked to the action’s outcome: this laboratory 
measure seems to capture the essential cognitive require-
ment of legal notions of responsibility, namely, to be aware 
of and in control of one’s own actions (Fig. 1).
Methods
Participants
A sample size of 20 participants per experiment was deter-
mined with GPower 3.1 (Faul et al. 2007) using the a priori 
procedure for within-subject t tests (assuming a large effect 
size of 0.80; alpha = 0.05; power = 0.95; Cohen 1988). In 
total, 60 female right-handed volunteers (mean age = 23.53, 
SD 4.01) participated in the study (time reimbursement: 
£7.50/h). Ethical approval for all studies was obtained 
from the UCL Research Ethics Committee (project code 
4435/001), prior to commencement of any testing activi-
ties. Participants gave written informed consent before tak-
ing part in the study.
Materials and procedure
Intentional binding paradigm
The intentional binding paradigm is a quantitative proxy 
measure of sense of agency that has been extensively used. 
Our procedure followed that of the previous studies (Hag-
gard et al. 2002; see also supplementary material). Briefly, 
in this task, on each trial, participants are instructed to press 
a key on the keyboard in front of them at a time of their 
choosing, while fixating the centre of a clock displayed on 
the screen with a continuously rotating clock hand. A tone 
occurs at a fixed duration of 250 ms after each keypress. 
This brief interval between action and tone gives partici-
pants the impression of causing the tone. Participants are 
then prompted to say, where the clock hand was on the clock 
face in the moment they pressed the key. The experimenter 
records their verbal response, and launches the next trial. 
The judgement error between the reported and actual time 
of action is calculated. Next, action binding is obtained by 
calculating the difference in average judgement error for 
actions made in a baseline block, in which no tone occurs, 
and actions made in an operant condition, where the action 
always elicits the tone 250 ms later. Action binding serves 
as an implicit marker of sense of agency.
Experiments 1 and 2 combined a fear induction proce-
dure with the intentional binding task (see “Fear induction”). 
Experiment 3 combined an anger induction procedure with 
the intentional binding task (see “Anger induction”). In all 
three experiments, participants completed six time estima-
tion blocks of 32 trials each. Blocks 1 and 6 were baseline 
blocks (i.e., no tone occurred). Blocks 2–5 were operant 
blocks (i.e., a tone occurred 250 ms after the participant’s 
keypress).
Fear induction
The Threat of Shock paradigm was used to induce fear 
(Davis et al. 2010; Robinson et al. 2013; Schmitz and Grillon 
2012). In this procedure, some moderately painful shocks 
are delivered early on in the experiment. This causes par-
ticipants to anticipate more shocks, even on trials, where 
they actually receive no shock. Thus, interest focusses on 
Fig. 1  Schematic of action binding. Action binding is a measure of 
the subjective experience of the linkage between an action and its 
outcome (Haggard et  al. 2002). Action binding is calculated as the 
difference in the perceived time of the action between the operant 
condition, in which the action produces an auditory tone, and a base-
line block, in which the action does not produce any tone. The per-
ceived time of a voluntary action shifts towards the time of a subse-
quent tone in the operant condition, relative to the baseline
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how participants’ expectation, or fear, of subsequent shocks 
alters cognition—in our case, sense of agency.
To deliver the painful stimulation, a Digitimer DS7A 
constant current stimulator was used. Two electrodes were 
placed on the back of the participants’ left hand, since they 
were using the right hand for the keypress (all participants 
were right-handed). For the pain calibration, prior to experi-
ments 1 and 2, each participant’s individual pain threshold 
was determined using a stepwise approximation procedure, 
increasing the stimulation in small steps of 1 mA, until the 
shocks were “painful but definitely bearable” (see supple-
mentary materials for further details).
Our participants performed 4 operant blocks of which 
2 blocks were “threat” blocks (the word “threat” was dis-
played on the screen) and participants were informed they 
could receive a shock at any time. The other 2 blocks were 
“safe” blocks (the word “safe” was displayed on the screen) 
and participants were informed that they would receive no 
painful shocks. Threat and Safe blocks were alternated, and 
the starting block was counterbalanced (experiment 1), or 
interleaved in a fixed order (threat–safe–threat–safe; experi-
ment 2). In experiment 1, the electric shocks occurred simul-
taneously with the keypress. In experiment 2, they occurred 
at the time of the subsequent tone. This latter arrangement 
controls for potential effects of prior entry (subjective expe-
rience of salient events occurring earlier in time; Spence 
and Parise 2010).
Our implementation of this paradigm follows the pro-
cedure as detailed below and is explained further in 
the supplementary material. Participants in the “fear” 
action binding paradigm were informed that occasional 
randomly-interleaved shocks to their hand might occur in 
some blocks of the experiment. For this, blocks of trials 
in the intentional binding task were labelled on-screen as 
“threat” or “safe”. Participants were informed that they 
might receive a painful shock at any time in “threat” blocks. 
Five painful shocks were given on random trials early in 
“threat” blocks. Expectation (or fear) of painful shock in 
threat blocks was hypothesised to influence action binding. 
In “safe” blocks, participants were informed they would 
not receive any painful shocks, and accordingly, no painful 
shocks were given (experiment 1), or five early non-painful 
shocks at detection threshold were given (experiment 2, see 
supplementary methods for justification). Participants also 
performed 2 baseline blocks, one before and one after the 4 
operant blocks. Shock trials were discarded, and action bind-
ing was analysed for trials without shocks (Fig. 2).
Anger induction
In experiment 3, we used a frustration paradigm called 
the “Impossible Task” which is a common procedure for 
inducing anger or frustration (Buss 1961; Taylor 1967). 
The rationale behind this paradigm is that the participant is 
assigned a task, but successful performance on the assign-
ment is never possible, no matter how hard the participant 
tries. This task has been used to provoke anger states, since 
the participant acts in expectation of a reward, but never 
obtains it (Blair 2012).
For the present experiment, participants were informed 
that in addition to the Clock estimation task, a reaction time 
(RT) task would be embedded in the 4 operant blocks. Our 
Fig. 2  A Illustration of fear induction procedure. Threat and Safe 
blocks were alternated, and the starting block was counterbalanced 
(experiment 1), or interleaved in a fixed order, always A–B–A–B 
(threat–safe–threat–safe; experiment 2). B Illustration of anger induc-
tion procedure. The operant blocks were interleaved in a fixed order, 
always A–B–A–B (learn–test–learn–test; experiment 3). In all three 
experiments, participants performed 2 baseline blocks, one before 
and one after the 4 operant blocks. See text and supplementary mate-
rial for full details
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implementation of this paradigm follows the procedure as 
detailed below and is explained further in the supplemen-
tary material. Participants were instructed that whenever the 
screen background colour would change, they should press 
F1 as quickly as possible using their right hand, reaching 
across the body midline horizontally. They were told that 
in 2 “learning” blocks they would receive feedback on their 
performance. They were promised a reward of £2.50 in addi-
tion to their final pay if they were fast enough in the RT 
trials. If they heard a “beep” sound, that would mean that 
they had been fast enough. If they heard a “buzz” sound, 
that would mean they had not been fast enough, and they 
had lost 25p of the £2.50. In fact, the program was set such 
that the outcome tone was always a buzz. Thus, feedback 
was misleading, and frustrating for participants, and the 
“learning” blocks in fact aimed to induce anger. In the 2 
remaining operant blocks, the “test” blocks (control condi-
tion), participants were informed that they could ‘practice 
the task’ without affecting their potential reward bonus. 
They were told that their RT would be monitored as in the 
learning blocks and that they were to perform as the task as 
quickly as possible, just as they had learned in the “learning” 
blocks. Learning and test blocks were interleaved, in a fixed 
order, starting with a learning block. Probe reaching trials 
were discarded, and only action binding trials were analysed. 
Again, participants performed 2 baseline blocks in which 
they made judgements of actions in the absence of tones. 
The baseline blocks occurred both before and one after the 
4 operant blocks (Table 1).
Results
Manipulation checks showed that participants indeed expe-
rienced the emotional states targeted. In the post-session 
questionnaire of the fear experiment (experiment 2) partici-
pants reported to have been fearful during the threat blocks 
(m = 0.8, SD 1.77; range − 3 to + 3), and not fearful in the 
safe blocks (m = − 2.85; SD 0.49; range − 1 to − 3); (t = 2.09, 
df = 19, p < 0.001). Likewise, in the anger experiment 
(experiment 3), participants reported to have been angry/
frustrated during the anger blocks (m = 0.8, SD 1.61; range 
− 3 to + 3) and less angry in the control blocks (m = 0.1; 
SD 1.65; range − 3 to + 3); (t = 2.09, df = 19, p = 0.006). See 
supplementary materials for details. Shock trials (experi-
ments 1 and 2) and probe reaching trials (experiment 3) were 
discarded, and only action binding trials were analysed.
Main analysis
For both experiments 1 and 2, separate 2 × 2 repeated meas-
ures (RM) ANOVAs were conducted with the factors Occur-
rence (1st time, 2nd time, to control for order effects) and 
State (Fear, Neutral). In experiment 1, ANOVA revealed a 




 = 0.189 90% confidence intervals [CI] for 휂2
p
 = [0.0004, 
0.4089]). No other main effects or interactions were signifi-
cant (Occurrence: F(1,19) = 0.353, p = 0.559, 휂2
p
 = 0.018; 
Occurrence × State: F(1,19) = 0.619, p = 0.441, 휂2
p
 = 0.032). 
Table 1  Stimulus parameters, 
descriptive measures and post-
session questionnaires for the 
three experiments
Threshold values refer to level of electrical stimulation just detectable, or just experienced as painful. Inten-
sity rating is a subjective estimate of pain level at threshold. Number of shocks/probes: participant’s post-
session estimate of number of shocks received in experiments 1 and 2, or of number of probe reaching 
trials in experiment 3
Fear Anger
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 25.2 4.67 21.95 3.33 23.45 3.39
Detection threshold (µv) 25 5.13 20.75 4.17 NA NA
Pain threshold (µv) 225.75 118.15 178.25 88.20 NA NA
Intensity rating 7.35 0.99 6.1 2.21 NA NA
Estimated number of shocks/
probes (fear/anger blocks)
10.25 3.20 10.2 3.41 7.6 2.30
Estimated number shocks/probes 
(neutral blocks)
NA NA 5.6 4.84 6.4 2.35
How scared? 1.15 1.35 0.8 1.77 − 2.1 1.21
How angry? − 2.15 1.18 − 1.05 1.23 0.8 1.61
BAS drive 12.7 2.23 9.05 2.14 11.4 1.75
BAS fun seeking 12.9 1.97 8.6 2.28 12.32 1.60
BAS reward responsiveness 18.1 1.23 7.05 1.82 18.25 1.29
BIS 20.85 4.43 13.85 2.39 22.05 2.84
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In experiment 2 there was a trend of State (F(1,19) = 3.836, 
p = 0.065, 휂2
p
 = 0.168, 90% CI [0.0000, 0.3893]), in the same 
direction as experiment 1. Participants showed less action 
binding in a fear state. No other main effects or interactions 









For experiment 3, a 2 × 2 repeated measures (RM) 
ANOVA was conducted with the factors Occurrence (1st 
time, 2nd time) and State (Anger, Neutral). ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of State (F(1,19) = 4.847, 
p = 0.040, 휂2
p
 = 0.203, 90% CI = [0.0051, 0.4226]). Partici-
pants showed reduced action binding when angry. No other 
main effects or interactions were significant (Occurrence: 
F(1,19) = 0.385, p = 0.542, 휂2
p
 = 0.020; Occurrence × State: 
F(1,19) = 1.860, p = 0.189, 휂2
p
 = 0.089). See supplementary 
material for additional details (Fig. 3).
Discussion
We found that both fear and anger inductions reduced our 
chosen implicit measure of sense of agency, namely inten-
tional binding, or the perceptual attraction of a voluntary 
action towards its outcome. The prepotent action tendency 
in response to a fearful event is withdrawal, while for anger, 
it is approach (Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009; Davidson 
1992; Frijda 1987; LeDoux 2003). However, these contrast-
ing polarities of emotional modulation for fear and anger 
were not seen for our subjective sense of agency measure: 
both states resulted in a reduction of participants’ sense of 
agency.
Our result extends previous work in two important ways. 
First, our effect was found for action binding, while previous 
studies found valence effects primarily for outcome bind-
ing (Gentsch et al. 2015; Takahata et al. 2012; Yoshie and 
Haggard 2013, 2017). Action binding is potentially a more 
informative measure of action-outcome association than 
outcome binding: it is independent of the physical charac-
teristics of the outcome event, while outcome binding is not 
(Wolpe and Rowe 2014). Second, we studied how an emo-
tional state influenced sense of agency, rather than percep-
tion of events that were themselves emotionally significant. 
Again, this makes it unlikely that our time estimation results 
merely reflect specific features of our stimuli.
Fear and anger are both negative emotions, and both 
reduced our implicit measure of sense of agency. In that 
sense, we replicate previous findings of a reduced sense of 
agency in the presence of negative, compared to positive, 
emotion (Yoshie and Haggard 2013). Importantly, however, 
the negative emotion in our study was not linked to any 
specific event on those trials analysed for binding. Rather, 
negative emotion was linked to the participant’s emotional 
state at the time of acting. In both cases, the impact of nega-
tive emotion was a reduction in sense of agency. This could 
be interpreted as a psychological distancing from action 
outcomes.
Our study focussed on just two specific emotions that have 
been classically associated with loss of control, and poten-
tially with reduced responsibility. Moreover, we found that 
both these emotions had comparable effects on our measure 
of sense of agency. Therefore, one might ask whether modu-
lations of sense of agency are specific for particular emo-
tions at all, or might alternatively reflect non-specific fac-
tors accompanying these emotions, such as general arousal. 
Many psychological studies distinguish emotional valence 
from arousal by demonstrating opposite directions for effects 
of positive and negative emotions. In contrast, arousal is 
generally assumed to be unipolar: both positive and negative 
emotions are thought to increase arousal (Lang and Brad-
ley 2010; Lang et al. 2008). We found that two negative 
emotions both had effects in the same direction on sense of 
agency. Thus, arousal interpretations cannot be entirely ruled 
out. Nevertheless, we think that non-specific arousal cannot 
explain all emotional modulations of sense of agency for 
several reasons. First, the best-established effect of arousal 
on time perception is a speeding up of an ‘internal clock’, 
probably mediated by transient fluctuations in dopamine (for 
a review, see Droit-Volet and Meck 2007). However, those 
studies were based on changes in duration perception, rather 
Fig. 3  Action binding in emotionally neutral control blocks, and 
in conditions inducing fear or anger. Error bars represent SEM. 
*p < 0.05, ƚ = 0.065
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than the cross-modal event perception studied here. Consist-
ent shifts in perception of a single event, such as our action 
binding measure, are not easily explained by mere changes 
in arousal (Droit-Volet and Meck 2007). Second, authors 
of previous experimental studies have suggested that emo-
tional stimuli that are equally arousing could have opposite 
effects on sense of agency, with the direction of the effect 
depending on their negative vs positive valence. In studies 
of financial wins and losses, or emotional sounds as action 
outcomes, negative outcomes reduced intentional binding 
relative to neutral outcomes. Yet enhancing effects of posi-
tive outcomes on intentional binding were small or absent, 
relative to neutral outcomes (Gentsch and Synofzik 2014; 
Takahata et al. 2012; Yoshie and Haggard 2013). Since par-
ticipants in those studies rated positive and negative stimuli 
as equally arousing, arousal cannot readily explain such 
valence-dependent effects. Finally, two studies that specifi-
cally aimed to investigate effects of unspecific arousal on 
sense of agency both showed stronger sense of agency under 
high arousal conditions (Minohara et al. 2016; Wen et al. 
2015)—opposite to the effects of fear and anger states that 
we found here (high arousal states of negative valence).
Our result should not be overinterpreted, either scientifi-
cally or normatively. Importantly, a reduced sense of agency 
does not imply that participants had no sense of agency, nor 
that they acted involuntarily. We assume that our participants 
retained full awareness of their actions and outcomes, and 
that their keypress actions were mediated by cortical volun-
tary motor systems throughout. Our findings merely sug-
gest that they experienced less linkage between action and 
outcome under strong emotion. On the normative side, the 
fact that sense of agency is reduced by negative emotional 
states does not demonstrate total lack of responsibility, nor 
condone any specific action. Feeling less responsible does 
not necessarily make one actually less responsible (see sup-
plementary material for a focussed discussion of relevance 
of our results to legal concepts of responsibility). For exam-
ple, the law might reasonably require individuals to man-
age situations of high emotion so as to avoid irresponsible 
actions. Our surprising finding of anger-induced reduction 
in sense of agency may be particularly relevant in the con-
text of anger management. The combination of increased 
drive to act, together with a reduced sense of control over 
one’s action, will be familiar to anyone who has spoken, or 
received, an unkind word in anger. Society normally expects 
healthy adults to manage anger through a process of self-
control, and many social institutions carefully teach such 
self-control. For example, anger management techniques 
teach individuals to “walk away before you lose it” (Gra-
ham 1998; Grave and Blissett 2004; Kendall 2000; NHS 
Choices 2015).
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